What kind of document it is
The Recommendation asks OECD Members and other countries that adhere to it to "take due account" of the Principles, which form part of the Recommendation. It invites the OECD Secretary-General and Adherents to spread them and invites non-Adherents to take them into account (p. 6). It also tells the OECD's Corporate Governance Committee to run a forum, keep the assessment methodology up to date, monitor trends and report to the Council (p. 6).
The Principles describe corporate governance as the set of relationships between a company's management, board, shareholders and stakeholders, and the structure through which objectives are set and performance monitored (p. 7). They do not set detailed rules. They identify objectives and suggest ways to reach them through legislation, regulation, listing rules, self-regulation, contracts, voluntary commitments and business practice, and the right mix depends on each country (p. 7).
Why it matters
The text names three public policy benefits of good governance (pp. 7-8):
- Access to financing. Credible governance that follows international norms helps companies raise capital, including from foreign investors, and affects what that capital costs (p. 7).
- Investor protection. Transparent, accountable boards build trust in markets. Many households invest in equity markets directly or through pension and investment funds, so protecting them matters, including across borders (p. 7).
- Sustainability and resilience. Investors are looking beyond financial performance to risks and opportunities from broader economic, environmental and societal challenges. A sound framework should include reliable, consistent and comparable disclosure of material sustainability information, including on climate change (p. 8).
How the Principles approach the subject
They are outcome-oriented, not prescriptive. The text says there is no single model of good governance, that companies vary in maturity, size and complexity, and that the Principles do not second-guess business judgement or advocate any particular board structure (p. 8). Implementation is assessed by "functional equivalence": there are many ways to reach the same outcome, through institutions, laws and company rules (p. 5).
They focus on publicly traded companies, financial and non-financial. The text says they may also help improve governance in unlisted companies. While some Principles suit large firms better, it encourages policy makers to raise awareness among all companies, including smaller and unlisted ones and companies that issue debt securities (p. 8). They complement, and refer to, other standards such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (p. 8).
The 2023 revision
The Committee decided to revise the 2015 text because of developments in sustainability, ownership concentration, institutional investors and digitalisation (p. 3). It started in June 2021 with ten priority areas, held drafting discussions through 2022 and 2023, and consulted G20 and FSB members, other non-members, the public, Business at OECD and the Trade Union Advisory Council (p. 3). A 2020 report to the Council had found that the Recommendation was an essential reference and that most Adherents had amended their company law, securities law or both to align with it (p. 4).
Chapter I: the framework (pp. 9-13)
The framework should promote transparent and fair markets and efficient use of resources, be consistent with the rule of law and support effective supervision and enforcement (p. 9). The supporting Principles say that governance requirements should be developed with an eye to access to finance, stability, sustainability and market integrity (I.A), be transparent and enforceable (I.B), and be backed by clearly divided responsibilities among authorities (I.C), supportive stock market regulation (I.D) and regulators with authority, independence and resources (I.E) (pp. 10-11). Digital technologies can help supervision if their risks are managed (I.F), cross-border co-operation should be enhanced (I.G), and oversight should reach company groups (I.H) (pp. 12-13). The notes mention that codes based on "comply or explain" can add flexibility to legislation (p. 9).
Chapter II: shareholder rights and equal treatment (pp. 13-20)
The headline Principle says the framework should protect and facilitate shareholders' rights and ensure equitable treatment of all shareholders, including minority and foreign ones, with effective redress at reasonable cost and without excessive delay (p. 13).
- Seven basic rights: registration, transfer, information, voting, electing and removing board members, a share of profits and a say in the external auditor (II.A, p. 14).
- A right to take part in decisions on fundamental changes, such as amending the company's constitution, authorising more shares and extraordinary transactions (II.B, p. 14).
- Effective participation in general meetings, including remote participation, the chance to ask the board questions and put items on the agenda, and removal of obstacles to cross-border voting (II.C, pp. 15-17).
- Equal treatment of shareholders within the same class (II.E, p. 17).
- Related party transactions should be approved and conducted so that conflicts are managed, and directors and key executives should disclose material interests to the board (II.F, p. 18).
- Protection for minority shareholders against abuse by controlling shareholders, with effective redress (II.G, p. 19).
- Efficient and transparent markets for corporate control, and no use of anti-takeover devices to shield management from accountability (II.H, pp. 19-20).
Chapter III: investors, stock markets and intermediaries (pp. 20-24)
Institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity should disclose their governance and voting policies and how they manage material conflicts of interest (III.A and III.C, pp. 20-22). Custodians and nominees should cast votes as the beneficial owner directs (III.B, p. 21). Proxy advisors, analysts, brokers, ESG rating and data providers, credit rating agencies and index providers should disclose and minimise conflicts of interest where they are regulated (III.D, p. 22). Insider trading and market manipulation should be prohibited and enforced, cross-listed companies should clearly disclose which governance laws apply, and stock markets should provide fair price discovery (III.E-G, p. 23).
Chapter IV: disclosure and transparency (pp. 24-30)
Timely, accurate disclosure should cover all material matters, including finances, performance, sustainability, ownership and governance (p. 24). The listed items include financial and operating results, company objectives and sustainability information, capital and group structures, major shareholders and beneficial owners, board composition and qualifications, remuneration, related party transactions, foreseeable risks, governance policies and debt contracts (IV.A.1-10, pp. 24-28). Information should follow internationally recognised accounting and disclosure standards (IV.B). An annual external audit should be done by an independent, competent and qualified auditor, who is accountable to shareholders and owes a duty of professional care in the public interest (IV.C-D, pp. 28-29). Channels for sharing information should give equal, timely and low-cost access (IV.E, p. 29).
Chapter V: the board (pp. 30-38)
The board's job is strategic guidance, effective monitoring of management and accountability to the company and shareholders (p. 30).
- Directors should act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence and care, and in the best interest of the company and shareholders, taking stakeholders into account. They should be protected from litigation where a decision was made in good faith with due diligence (V.A, pp. 30-31).
- The board should treat shareholder groups fairly and apply high ethical standards (V.B-C, p. 31).
- Key functions include guiding strategy and major spending, reviewing risk management, monitoring governance practices, selecting and monitoring executives and succession, aligning pay with long-term interests, a transparent nomination process, managing conflicts and related party abuse, ensuring the integrity of accounts and controls, and overseeing disclosure (V.D.1-9, pp. 32-35).
- Directors should exercise objective independent judgement. Boards should consider enough independent members for conflict-prone tasks and specialised committees, notably an audit committee. Directors should be able to commit enough time, and boards should regularly evaluate their performance and mix of backgrounds and competences, including gender and other forms of diversity (V.E, pp. 35-37).
- Directors should have accurate, relevant and timely information, and where employee representation is mandated, representatives should be given access to information and training (V.F-G, p. 38).
Chapter VI: sustainability and resilience (pp. 38-44)
The framework should give companies and investors incentives to decide and manage risks in ways that contribute to the company's sustainability and resilience (p. 38).
- Disclosure (VI.A, pp. 39-41). Sustainability disclosure should be consistent, comparable and reliable, covering past and forward-looking information that a reasonable investor would find important. It may be material if it could reasonably influence an investor's assessment of value or decisions. Frameworks should follow high-quality internationally recognised standards, connect sustainability and financial reporting, and require reliable metrics where a company publicly sets a target. Phasing in independent assurance should be considered.
- Dialogue (VI.B, pp. 41-42). Frameworks should allow companies, shareholders and stakeholders to exchange views on sustainability matters. Where companies can adopt forms combining profit and public benefit objectives, dissenting shareholder rights should receive due consideration.
- Board oversight (VI.C, p. 42). Boards should consider material sustainability risks and opportunities, including climate-related physical and transition risks, when reviewing strategy, risk management and internal controls. Lobbying should be coherent with stated targets and capital structure should be resilient under different scenarios.
- Stakeholders (VI.D, pp. 42-44). Legal and contractual rights are to be respected, with effective redress, employee participation mechanisms and access to information. Workers and others should be able to raise concerns about illegal or unethical practices with the board or public authorities without losing their rights. The framework should facilitate bondholder rights and be backed by an effective insolvency framework.
Follow-up
The OECD uses an Assessment Methodology, revised after 2023, to review how jurisdictions apply the Principles. It underpins reviews linked to the Financial Stability Board's Key Standards, including the World Bank's Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes and the IMF's Financial Sector Assessment Program (p. 5). Implementation is also monitored through the biennial OECD Corporate Governance Factbook and peer reviews. The next report to the Council is due in 2028 (pp. 4-5).